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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR BIGGS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID R. CALVERT, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No. 940562-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 172-171) on Monday, 
June 20, 1994, appealing from the Order of Dismissal entered May 
20, 1994. (R. 170-169.) The appeal was timely. Utah R. App. P. 
4(a). Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the court have personal jurisdiction over defendant, a 
Colorado resident, based on his transaction of business with 
plaintiff through personal visits in Utah, numerous telephone calls 
and letters to plaintiff in Utah, and the execution of contracts in 
Colorado which defendant then mailed to Utah? The issue was 
resolved below solely on documentary evidence, and is therefore 
reviewed by this Court for correctness. Arguello v. Industrial 
Woodworking Machine, 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1992): 
It is declared, as a matter of 
legislative determination, that the public 
interest demands the state provide its 
citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who, through 
certain significant minimal contacts with this 
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled 
to the state's protection. This legislative 
action is deemed necessary because of 
technological progress which has substantially 
increased the flow of commerce between the 
several states resulting in increased 
interaction between persons of this state and 
persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure 
maximum protection to citizens of this state, 
should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction 
over nonresident defendants to the fullest 
extent permitted by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23 (1992): 
As used in this act: 
(1) The words "any person" mean any 
individual, firm, company, association, 
or corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of 
business within this state" mean 
activities of a nonresident person, his 
agents, or representatives in this state 
which affect persons or businesses within 
the state of Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1994): 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-
10a-1501, whether or not a citizen or resident 
of this state, who in person or through an 
agent does any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself, and if an individual, 
his personal representative, to the jurisdic-
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tion of the courts of this state as to any 
claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business 
within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services 
or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within 
this state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or posses-
sion of any real estate situated in this 
state; 
(5) contracting to insure any 
person, property, or risk located within 
this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of 
divorce, separate maintenance, or child 
support, having resided, in the marital 
relationship, within this state notwith-
standing subsequent departure from the 
state; or the commission in this state of 
the act giving rise to the claim, so long 
as that act is not a mere omission, 
failure to act, or occurrence over which 
the defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual 
intercourse within this state which gives 
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, 
Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for 
the purpose of establishing 
responsibility for child support. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a civil action to recover 
damages for breach of contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiff 
filed his complaint November 22, 1993. (R. 13-1.) Defendant was 
served personally in Colorado on December 7, 1993 (R. 14), and on 
March 4, 1994, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. (R. 18-17.) The trial court considered the 
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matter on the written memoranda, without oral arguments, and 
entered a memorandum decision granting the motion of April 26, 
1994. (R. 166-163.) The formal order of dismissal was entered May 
20, 1994. (R. 170-169). 
Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on June 20, 1994. (R. 
172-171.) The Utah Supreme Court poured this case over to the 
Court of Appeals on September 21, 1994. (R. 178.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On June 24, 1975, defendant assigned a promissory note for 
$101,500 to plaintiff1 in satisfaction of prior obligations. (R. 
12 f 6.) On September 25, 1975, defendant personally guaranteed 
the obligation reflected in the promissory note and agreed to pay 
an additional 1% interest above the interest rate of the note, in 
exchange for which plaintiff waived any claim under certain prior 
security agreements. (R. 5-4, 12 J[ 7.) Defendant reaffirmed his 
guarantee on April 11, 1977 (R. 12 J 8) and on January 4, 1983. (R. 
12 f 9.) 
The September 25, 1975, guarantee was finalized by plaintiff's 
signature in Utah. Defendant had signed the document previously in 
Colorado. (R. 5-4.) The agreement contemplated performance in 
Utah. (Id., R. 12 5 3.) The subsequent reaffirmations were each 
!The assignment and subsequent guarantees and other obligations 
were in favor of plaintiff and his wife, Katherine Biggs. 
Katherine Biggs passed away November 10, 1985. (R. 106.) 
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apparently signed by defendant in Colorado, but mailed by defendant 
to plaintiff in Utah. (R. 3-1.) 
Defendant visited plaintiff in Utah on several occasions and 
negotiated arrangements for defendant's performance of his 
obligations under the note and guarantees. (R. 47, 54, 71, 77, 
114, 131.) The last visit confirmed in the record occurred in 
April 1989, and resulted in an agreement, made in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, concerning "time parameters" for performance under the 
agreements. (R. 131.) There were also numerous telephone calls 
between the parties relating to the debt, and defendant sent at 
least 80 letters to plaintiff in Utah regarding the debt. (R. 139-
25.) 
The obligor on the note defaulted. (R. 12 f 10.) Defendant 
made some payments pursuant to his personal guarantee, but also 
defaulted. (R. 12 5 11.) Plaintiff brought this action to compel 
payment of the balance due under the note and personal guarantee. 
(R. 12 5 12.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff asserts specific personal jurisdiction, which exists 
if the long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction, and if the 
exercise of jurisdiction satisfies due process. Both requirements 
are met. 
The long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction for acts arising 
out of the transaction of any business within the state. Defendant 
signed and sent to Utah a written guarantee promising to pay the 
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debt to plaintiff in Utah. Defendant also negotiated parts of the 
transaction and subsequent payment modifications while in Utah. 
Defendant further directed many letters and telephone calls to 
Utah. 
Due process is satisfied. Defendant's numerous contacts, in 
person, by letter, and by telephone, show purposeful acts directed 
at the forum state. Defendant could reasonably have expected to be 
haled into court in Utah. The amount of the claim is large 
compared with the inconvenience to defendant of litigating here, 
and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are 
consistent with the exercise of jurisdiction here. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECT TO THE UTAH LONG-ARM 
STATUTE AND HAD SUFFICIENT MINIMUM CONTACTS 
TO JUSTIFY PERSONAL JURISDICTION. 
A. Introduction and Standard of Review. 
Because this case was decided on documentary evidence only, 
this appeal "presents only legal questions that are reviewed for 
correctness." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine, 838 P. 2d 
1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). The factual allegations in plaintiff's 
complaint are accepted as true. "The plaintiff's factual 
allegations are accepted as true unless specifically controverted 
by the defendant's affidavits or by depositions, but any disputes 
in the documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiff's favor." 
Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 112 S.Ct. 
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276 (1991). No affidavits or depositions were filed in this case 
to rebut the allegations of the complaint. 
There are two categories of personal jurisdiction: general 
personal jurisdiction resulting from substantial and continuous 
local activity in the forum state, and specific personal 
jurisdiction, which "gives a court power over a defendant only with 
respect to claims arising out of the particular activities of the 
defendant in the forum state." Arquelle 838 P.2d at 1122. 
While defendant's contacts with Utah are arguably both 
substantial and continuous (see R. 146), plaintiff seeks only a 
holding of specific personal jurisdiction. Specific personal 
jurisdiction requires satisfaction of both the state long-arm 
statute and federal due process requirements. Arcruello, 838 P.2d 
at 1122. 
B. The Unrebutted Allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint 
Establish that Defendant Transacted Business in Utah. 
Utah's long-arm statute reaches any claim arising from "the 
transaction of any business within this state[.]" Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-24(1) (Supp. 1994). Thus sufficient to confer personal 
jurisdiction are any "activities of a nonresident person, his 
agents, or representatives in this state which affect persons or 
businesses within the state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23 
(1992). The statutes should be interpreted in light of the 
legislative acknowledgement that "technological progress" has 
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permitted interaction between residents of different states not 
previously possible. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1992). 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges: "The agreements which are the 
subject of this action were entered into and intended to be 
performed in the State of Utah." (R. 13 f 3.) Because "plain-
tiff ' s factual allegations are accepted as true unless specifically 
controverted by the defendant's affidavits," Anderson, 807 P.2d at 
827, and because defendant filed no affidavits to controvert the 
allegations of the complaint, this Court should treat this 
allegation as fact. It follows that defendant did transact 
business in the state of Utah. 
C. The Evidence Confirms that Defendant Transacted Business 
in Utah. 
If this Court determines to look beyond the allegations of the 
complaint, the Court should accept as true the factual statements 
in plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and the supporting documents. (R. 148-25.) Although there 
is no affidavit affirming the truth of those statements, defendant 
did not object to the lack of an affidavit nor otherwise contest 
the truth of those statements. (R. 160-149.) Defendant is 
therefore deemed to have waived whatever evidentiary defects may 
exist. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development, 659 P. 2d 
1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). 
The activities of defendant in this state related to the 
instant claim include several visits with plaintiff in Utah. It 
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may reasonably be inferred that the parties negotiated concerning 
the outstanding debt during each of these visits. That such 
negotiations and discussions occurred is confirmed by the letters 
written by defendant following some of the visits. On May 21, 
1987, defendant wrote what he characterized a "followup letter" to 
advise plaintiff of the status of the debt. (R. 114.) Similarly 
on May 2, 1989, defendant wrote of "certain time parameters" the 
parties had negotiated in Salt Lake City, Utah, concerning the 
debt. (R. 131.) 
Defendant also sought plaintiff's signature, in Utah, agreeing 
to new payment arrangements and to waive prior claims. (R. 5-4, 41-
39.) Defendant further made numerous telephone calls to plaintiff 
in Utah to discuss the business transaction between them. These 
activities by defendant satisfy the state long-arm statute and the 
exercise of jurisdiction will not offend due process. 
That defendant transacted business in Utah is established by 
STV International Marketing v. Cannondale, 750 F. Supp. 1070 (D. 
Utah 1990). The defendant in that case, a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in Connecticut, entered into 
a contract with the plaintiff under which plaintiff was to sell 
defendant's products in Europe. Plaintiff's representatives had 
discussed the transaction with defendant's representatives in three 
meetings in Utah, two before the contract and one after. Telephone 
calls and correspondence also occurred, although the court 
characterized it as neither substantial nor continuous. The 
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parties didn't have a written commission agreement relating to the 
sales, but while plaintiff's representative was visiting in 
Connecticut defendant did give plaintiff a letter which set out the 
commission arrangement for the following year. The court 
nonetheless held that the Utah long-arm statute was satisfied: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23 defines 
"transaction of business within this state" as 
"activities of a non-resident person, his 
agents, or representatives in this state which 
affect persons or businesses within the state 
of Utah." This court previously has held that 
under this definition a person may transact 
business within the state despite an absence 
of physical presence in Utah. Brown v. Washoe 
Housing Authority, 625 F. Supp. 595, 599 (D. 
Utah 1985) ; Nova Mud v. Fletcher, 648 F. Supp. 
1123 (D. Utah 1986). In Nova Mud this court 
held that where a non-resident defendant 
telephoned the plaintiff, a Utah Corporation, 
to effectuate a contract with the corporation, 
the telephone call met the statutory 
requirements in that it "affect[ed] persons 
and businesses within the State of Utah." Id. 
at 1126. See McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 2 L. Ed. 2d 
223, 78 S. Ct. 199 (1957). Under the broad 
interpretations aforesaid, Cannondale 
"transacted business" within this state in 
connection with it's relationship with the 
Verhalens. 
750 F. Supp. at 1074-75. STV found a lack of jurisdiction for due 
process reasons because of factors not present in the instant case. 
Other courts have also found personal jurisdiction under 
similar circumstances. E.g., Hahn v. Vermont Law School, 698 F.2d 
48 (1st Cir. 1983) (Under "transacting any business" long-arm 
statute, Vermont law school was subject to suit in Massachusetts 
relating to actions solely in Vermont, including awarding failing 
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grade, where law school had mailed admissions materials to 
Massachusetts and had advertised in a Massachusetts publication); 
Lazzaro v. Charlevoix Lakes. 310 N.W.2d 295 (Mich, Ct. App. 1981) 
("Transaction of any business within the state" clause of Michigan 
long-arm statute was satisfied where nonresident defendants signed 
in Ohio personal guarantee of Ohio loan, but proceeds of the loan 
were used for development of Michigan property). 
The documents before this Court support the reasonable 
inference that defendant transacted business in Utah. Because no 
evidence (affidavit, deposition, or live testimony) was submitted 
to the trial court, and because the complaint unambiguously alleges 
facts showing that defendant conducted business in Utah, to the 
extent there is any doubt as to whether defendant transacted 
business, the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
D. Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant Is 
Consistent with Due Process. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently summarized the due process 
requirements of personal jurisdiction as follows: 
Due process requires that before a court 
can exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant, the nonresident defen-
dant's contacts with Utah must be "such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
' traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 
154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting 
Mil liken v. Mever, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. 
Ct. 339, 343, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940)). Thus, 
defendant must have purposefully established 
minimum contacts within Utah, the forum state, 
such that the defendant could reasonably 
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anticipate being haled into court here. 
Bradford v. Naqle, 763 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 
1988). Further, we must balance the 
convenience of the parties and the interests 
of the forum state in assuming jurisdiction by 
examining "the relationship of the defendant, 
the forum, and the litigation, to each other." 
Mallory Eng'cr v. Ted R. Brown & Assocs., 618 
P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 
1029, 101 S. Ct. 602, 66 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1980). 
Radcliffe v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608, 612 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The record in this case shows purposeful contact by defendant 
with this state. Defendant visited the state at least four times 
with respect to this transaction and sent at least 80 letters to 
Utah, in addition to payments and numerous telephone calls. The 
cases cited above in connection with the "transacting any business" 
analysis also analyze the due process issues, and support the 
conclusion that due process is satisfied in this case. 
A Colorado case, Tucker v. Vista Financial Corp., 560 P. 2d 453 
(Colo. 1977), illustrates this point with facts very similar in 
quality to the instant case. Judith Tucker signed a promissory 
note in Colorado, payable in California. The opinion does not 
disclose that she had any other connection with California, nor 
that she had ever visited there with respect to the note. The 
plaintiff obtained a judgment against Tucker in California and sued 
to enforce it in Colorado. The court held the California court had 
personal jurisdiction over Tucker and the judgment was therefore 
valid. The court stated: "Here, Judith Tucker was co-maker of a 
note payable in California to a California bank and she authorized 
funds to be disbursed in California. These contacts are sufficient 
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for the proper exercise of jurisdiction." 560 P.2d at 455. See 
also Alameda National Bank v. Kanchanapoom, 752 F. Supp. 367, 369 
(D. Colo. 1990) ("The [Colorado jurisdictional] test is satisfied 
when a defendant acting outside of the forum state executes a 
promissory note that expressly obligates payment to a resident 
inside the forum state."). 
A balance of the convenience of the parties and the interests 
of the forum state also supports exercising jurisdiction. "[A]ny 
litigation undertaken in a foreign jurisdiction results in some 
inconvenience to the nonresident defendant," but that inconvenience 
"must be viewed in relation to the importance of the conflict 
litigated, which, in a commercial setting, is evidenced by the 
amount in controversy." Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown & 
Associates, 618 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah 1980). The amount in 
controversy here, with interest, is in excess of $165,000. The 
substantial size of this claim mitigates the concerns of 
inconvenience to defendant. Id. The documents also show that 
defendant made frequent trips to Utah unrelated to this claim, 
which also shows that any inconvenience of litigating in Utah is 
minimal. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant purposefully initiated numerous contacts with Utah 
related to plaintiff's claim, promised to pay plaintiff in Utah, 
sought plaintiff's signature in Utah on the relevant payment 
agreements, and visited Utah on at least four occasions with 
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respect to this transacted. These acts satisfy the statutory 
requirement of "transaction of any business within this state." 
Exercising personal jurisdiction over defendant is consistent 
with due process. Defendants contacts with the state related to 
this claim are much more than minimal, and the exercise of 
jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. 
The trial court erred in dismissing the case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. The order of dismissal should be reversed. 
Alternatively, the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing on the jurisdictional issues. 
DATED this / ^ day of December, 1994. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:^ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ Deputy 
ARTHUR BIGGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID R. CALVERT, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 930400621 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, no oral 
argument having been requested, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the 
following: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. The court finds undisputed that the Promissory note which was assigned from the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff was signed by the Defendant in Colorado, and mailed (from 
Colorado) to the Plaintiff in Utah. 
2. The court also finds undisputed that the letters containing the Defendant's additional 
personal guarantees related to the assigned promissory note were all written, signed, and 
mailed by the Defendant in Colorado, to the Plaintiff in Utah. 
3. Under Utah law, in order for the court to assert jurisdiction over a citizen of a foreign 
state, the claim must arise from an act or acts specifically enumerated within Utah's long-
arm statute. UCA § 78-27-26. 
4. Under the facts of this case, Plaintiff is alleging the Defendant fits within Utah's long-
arm statute by having transacted business within this state, as enumerated under UCA 
§ 78-27-24(1). 
5. The words "transaction of business within this state," as defined in UCA § 78-27-23, 
mean "activities of a nonresident person... in this state which affect persons or businesses 
within the state of Utah." UCA § 78-27-23 (emphasis added). 
6. Utah case law supports Defendant's argument that Defendant's mere sending 
documents of personal guarantee, and an assignment of rights and interest in a promissory 
note, all of which were signed by the Defendant in Colorado, all of which originated in 
Colorado, is insufficient to constitute "activities" of the Defendant "in this state" merely 
because these documents were sent from Colorado to a person residing in Utah, and the 
Defendant traveled to Utah on approximately four occasions in order to consummate the 
assignment of interest. 
7. Utah's protection of its citizens, as expressed by Plaintiff, is still limited by the scope 
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Under UCA § 78-27-22, it states: 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Emphasis added.) 
8. Defendant correctly states Utah case law's defining scope of what a defendant must 
do to allow Utah to assert jurisdiction over him/her without violating that person's due 
process rights. According to Utah case law, the defendant must purposely avail him/herself 
Memorandum Decision Page -2-
to the confines of Utah law by acts attributable to his/her own actions within the state of 
Utah, so that it is reasonable for the defendant to have anticipated suit here upon dispute over 
the in-state acts. Mere formation of a contract with a Utah resident, particularly where 
Defendant's signing of the Assignment of the promissory note, as well as his letters of 
personal guarantees related to the promissory note all took place in Colorado, is insufficient 
to overcome the due process requirements. 
9. Also part of the due process inquiry is the question of "fair play and substantial 
justice." From the facts of this case, it would be unfair to assume the Defendant reasonably 
anticipated his contact with the Plaintiffs related to assigning his interest in a promissory 
note, along with sending letters of personal guarantee on a note that originated in Colorado, 
would avail him to being subject to Utah law, even though he traveled here on up to four 
occasions in order to consummate the assignment. 
10. Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah law, the court finds that it does not 
have personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling 
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court 
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for signature. 
Dated this^fday of April, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: J. Grant Moody, Esq. 
F. Richards Smith III, Esq. 
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J. GRANT MOODY, #6282 
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER, #4910 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
2696 No. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR BIGGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID R. CALVERT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 930400621 
Judge Burningham 
THE COURT, having considered defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, and having considered the memoranda 
of counsel and accompanying exhibits, finds that personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant David R. Calvert is lacking for the 
reasons set forth in the Court's April 24th memorandum decision 
incorporated herein: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THIS CASE BE DISMISSED. 
?
-cfay of DATED this , 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
R/ BURWTTJGHAM 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following, this 
H day of May, 1994: 
F. Richards Smith III 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
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